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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH SAVING & LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT B. MECHAM, et al. 
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9159 
SECOND REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LUDLOW 
PLUMBING SUPPLY CO. 
Not only does loaning institutions and title insurance 
companies rely upon decisions of this Honorable Court in 
Mechanic's Lien cases, in financing construction and insuring 
titles to real properties in the state of Utah, but mechanics 
and materialmen also rely on the same decisions in furnish-
ing labor and materials for construction work. 
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This court has construed the lien laws of this state in 
the many cases cited and relied upon by appellant. There ap-
pears to be but little factual difference in the instant case 
and in the United States Building & Loan v:-~. Midvale case 
quoted from in appellant's original brief. In the Building & 
Loan case there were numerous owners, purchasers under 
contract, and the lots liened and owned by the contract pur-
chasers were not all contiguous but some were separated by 
lots of other owners not represented in the action. The 
same objection was urged there as is urged by respondent 
in this case. The same principal of la '" was applied in the 
U.S. Building & Loan case as was applied in the early case of 
Garner v Van Patten, 20 U. 342 and in the Eccles Lumber 
Co . v Martin case, cited in appellant'~ original brief. 
In the above three mentioned case~ thi~ court particular-
ly construed Sec. 38-1-8 UCA 1953 which section i~ ~o heavily 
relied upon by respondent. The court held that under our 
lien laws one is not limited to the filing of a lien on two 
or more properties only if they are contiguous \vhere more 
than one structure i:-~ involved. Neither ha:-~ thi~ court held 
that title to the properties liened n1 u:-~t be in one O\nler \rhere 
building is by one contractor and n1aterial~ are furnished 
under one contract. 
It is to be noted that ~ection 38-1-8 UCA 1953 i~ identi-
cal with Sec. 1387 R.S. 1898, and C.L. 1907, Sec. 1387; C.L. 
1917, Sec. 3737; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, Sec. 52-1-8, and the 
above mentioned cases having been decided after the en-
actment of the~e laws, our legi~lature has adopted the 
judicial construction given to section 38-1-8 UCA 1953 in 
thos~ decisions. See Sta mn1 Elec. Co. v Ha1niltonBrown 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Shoe Co. (lVIo.) 165 S.W. 2d 437, 4~1.1, and Drake Lumber 
\·. Paget, (Or.) 27 '1 P2d 804. 
Respondent insists on singling out and relying upon but 
one section of our lien statute Section 38-1-8 and completely 
ignores section 38-1-3 giving materialmen a lien upon the 
property for which they furnish materials, and section 38-1-
4 making two or more lots or subdivisions one for the pur-
pose of the lien law. Neither one of those sections contain 
the words "provided the properties are in the name of one 
~, 
owner. 
In the Eccle~ Lumber case the court said one cannot 
~ingle out or segregate a section or a part of a chapter and get 
the meaning or intent in the following words of Justice Frick: 
··In order to arrive at the true legislative intent, 
courts cannot segregate a section or a part of an en-
tire chapter upon a given subject, and from such 
part alone determine the true meaning or intent of 
the \vhole. \Ioreover, the object or purpose of the 
la·w a~ a w!lole tnu:--t Le con~idered. "' 
In the same case, Justice Frick makes an interesting 
analysis of section 1386, which is now Section 38-1-7 UCA 
1953 and section 1387 which is identical with section 38-1-8 
\vherein the same question was raised as is raised by re-
spondent in the instant case, that the claimant failed to state 
the amount due on each building liened. Justice Frick 
further said: 
"the lien is complete by complying with section 
1386. The statement of the amount due on each build-
ing separately, as provided in section 1387, would 
be but a restatement of the amount of the claim as 
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required by section 1386, in another form. As we 
view it, this restatement was not intended as an essen-
tial part in acquiring the lien. It could subserve no 
purpose to attain that end. It could in no way affect 
the amount claimed against the entire property. A 
discrimination must be made between the things that 
are necessary to acquire a lien and those that are 
merely intended to protect the interests of the lien 
claimants between or among themselves. The state-
ments in section 1387, as we view it, clearly belong 
to the latter class. The statements of the claimant 
provided for in section 1387 are made sufficient to 
acquire a lien and to protect the o'rner of the prop-
erty. To hold that a restatement of the amount of the 
claim in another form i~ likewise neces~ary to ac-
quire a lien, unless the statute require~ this to be 
done in terms, is adding, by constrncti'"ln, an es:-'en-
tial not required by the ~tatute." 
Section 38-1-7 requires the name of the o"1.1er to be 
given, provided the name of the owner i~ known to the lien 
claimant. It is evident that the legislature did not consider 
the name of the owner important. As was held in the Golden 
Belt Lumber case, ( Kan.) 26 P2d 27 4, it is the delivery 
of materials under a single contract ,,-hich determine the 
question whether several lots are ~ubject to a lien and not 
the location of the lots or the 1natter of o'rnership, and the 
lots need not be contiguous. It appears by the Eccles and 
U. S. Bldg. & Loan rases the provi~ion~ of the statute is 
met if the "·ork is done hy the ~an1e person and we think 
this is the same construction placed on the cases found in 10 
ALR and 75 ALR relied upon by respondent in it's petition 
and brief for re-hearing at page 5. Both of these references 
appear in annotation to ~eetion 38-l-8 UCA 1953. 
Respondent says at page 5 of it's brief that in none of 
the cases annotated in the t"·o ALR Yohune~ above referred 
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lo~ and in no casP- cited by appellant Ludlow, or which re-
spondent has been able to discover, has a single blanket lien 
covering property owned in severalty, in the face of an un-
ambiguous statute prohibiting the same, been allowed. It 
appears that respondent has misconstructed the decisions 
handed down by this court in the Garner, Eccles, and U. S. 
Bldg. & Loan cases and in the Colorado case of Branan Sand 
& Gravel quoted from in appellant's original brief at pages 
22 and 23. 
In the cases annotated in 10 and 7 5 ALR relied on by 
respondent the property affected was not in one owner, it 
appears this was not considered necessary. 
In the Golden Belt Lb. case cited at pages 28 and 33 of 
appellant's original brief, there the court at page 276 quotes 
from Stoltze v Hurd, 29 N.D. 412, 128 N.W. 115, 30 LRA 
(N.S.) 1219, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 871 as follows: 
·It was held that where 2 persons owning adjoining 
lots tnade a single contract for the erection of a build-
ing thereon, the lien must follow the contract, and a 
person who ~u pplied materials for the building under 
a single contract was entitled to a joint lien on the 
building and on both lots, but was not entitled to 
~epa rate liens on both lot~." 
and in Humphrey v Harrison Bros., U. S. Court of Appeals, 
1% F. 2d 630, held where materials are furnished to a 
multpilicity of houses comprised in a single project, it is not 
essential to validity of lien claim that furnisher show in what 
houses specific materials were used, or indeed that the mater-
ials were actually used on the project if they were pur-
chased for and de livered to the site of the work, and such 
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rule is applied whether materialman deals directly with the 
owner or sells to builder who in turn contracted with the 
owner to place materials in buildings. This same case held 
the lien valid as against 29 houses in a 135 house project 
although it was shown that plumbing supplies had not been 
installed in the 29 houses liened, hut in other houses in the 
project. The evidence showed all the materials were taken 
to the site from time to time as needed and the bills showed 
that the good~ were intended for and charged to the project. 
In Miller v Laval, (Ky.) },~0 SW 2nd 376 it was held 
that the intention of the parties determines whether a con-
tract is to he treated as an entirety or as severable. 
In the instant case the contractor \ras either the owner, 
should the court adopt the contention of respondent, or the 
agent for the owner if appellant's contention i~ adopted and 
it makes no difference whether the contract is with the o\rner 
or his agent in the application of our lien statute "-here the 
delivery of materials is admitted and \\rhere the only question 
is as to the validity and priority of the lien. In thi~ ca~e the 
account of appellant is admitted by the contractor. 
The only importance to the instant case \rhether re-
~pondent, Grow or Grow's companies or ~iecham ·was in fact 
the owner of the properties liened is not on the question of 
validity of the lien or it~ priority but in the application of 
the bonding act should appellant ·s lien he determined to he 
invalid, it having been admitted that no performance bond 
was furnished as to any of the improven1ents. Neither the 
trial court or this Honorable Court ruled on this point al-
though it was pleaded by appellant and the evidence was to 
tht· effect that no bond was furnished. 
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It was admitted that one of Grow's companies, Mid-
Utah Broadcasting Company, a defendant in the action, 
became the owner of the Schauerhamer area properties 
either during the course of construction or prior to con-
struction of some of the houses and that Mecham was it's 
contractor and that no performance bond was ever furnished. 
The trial court should have found that Mecham, the 
contractor, had no monies with which to purchase the LaMesa 
and Rowley properties, that the monies with which those 
properties were purchased came from respondent and. there-
fore :vr echam held title to same in trust for respondent 
\\·hirh company \vas the real party in interest. 
While the trial court found that Mecham acquired the 
Howley and LaMesa properties for a consideration which 
}lecham paid. The court did not find that Mecham was the 
owner of those properties. In fact the trial court did not 
make a finding as to who was in fact the owner of the prop-
erties. If appellant should concede for the purpose of argu-
n1ent that Mecham ·was the owner of the properties mortgag-
ed, and the lien of appellant covered properties not owned 
by ;\iiecham, even if the law was as is contended by respon-
dent, appellanfs lien would not be invalid but appellant 
·would be entitled to have its lien apportioned and applied 
to those lots owned by Mecham~ as was done by the Colorado 
court in the Branan case cited by appellant in its original 
brief at page 22, which case was based on a staute of Colo-
radio identical with section 38-1-3 UCA 1953 as is 
pointed out in appellanfs original brief; then Mecham would 
have dealt with appellant as owner-contractor and the statute 
would still apply. 
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In respondenfs brief in support of it's petition for re-
hearing it has cited at page 7 the case of W. P. Fuller v 
Fisher, 217 P.53, a California case predicated on Sec. 1183 
Code of Civil Procedure of California. From an examina-
tion of the case and Sec. 1183, it is apparent that the law 
there provides for the furnishing of the materials with the 
purpose that it be used or consumed in the work on the par-
ticular building upon which the lien is claimed and not a 
delivery to the site of construction. Respondent also cites 
the case of B. F. Salzer Lumber Co. a Colorado decision 
which it appears is favorable to appellant, the court having 
held where materials were furnished by a lumber company 
and delivered to and stockpiled on a vacant lot not a part of 
the property being improved, and it was contended that little 
or none of the material went into the construction but that 
some was used in another building being con~tructed by the 
contractor for other parties and that some of the lumber ·was 
sold by the contractor to other parties. It ·was al~o urged 
that the contractor ordered more lumber than 'ra~ necessary 
for the building liened and that another lumber company "ras 
also furnishing the same kind of lu1nher to the building. 
There the court said: 
"These contention~ of fact n1ust be admitted 'rith the 
additional staten1ent that the lumber company did 
not have kno\\"ledge that lumber for the same pur-
pose 'ras being furnished by another company." 
In the Salzar Lumber case the court cites the case of 
Small v Foley~ 8 Colo. App. 444~ 17 P.67, in "chich it ap-
peared that $;35 worth of hardware furnished by the lien 
claimant was removed by the contractor and used in another 
house not under the contract under which the improvements 
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were being n1ade on the property liened. As to this fact the 
court there said: 
~~so far as appears, those materials were removed by 
Rankin without the knowledge of the hardware com-
pany. Counsel says it was error to include this 
amount in the decree.~ .. 
In each of the above cases relied upon by respondent 
court held in favor of the lien claimant stating that it is not 
required that the materialman see that the material actually 
goes into the building. In so holding the court further said 
in the Salzer Lumber case: 
··There is nothing in this case tending to show other 
than a good faith sale by Salzer to the contractor~~ 
and that the· materials so sold was for use in the 
Opera House building and delivered on the grounds 
in the city of Ft. Collins used for the storage of 
materials to be u~ed in such building. The claim of 
lien ~hould be sustained." 
The facts in the Whittier v Puget Sound case also cited 
by respondent at page 7 are not in any degree like those of the 
instant case, and in the Eisenbeis v Workman case also cited 
at page 7 it appeared from claimants own testimony that he 
\\'a~ furnishing brick to the contractors without any regard 
a~ to \vhere they were going to use them and some of the 
brick were even used in a Customs House being erected by the 
contractor for the U. S. upon which the supplier could have 
had no lien. 
At page 9 of this same brief repsondent says with 
reference to a number of cases cited by appellant in it's 
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brief, which cases included the Sierra Nevada Lumber v 
Whitmore and the United States Building v Midvale cases, 
they were unable to find any support for appellant's position 
and that the Badger Lumber case cited by appellant is direct-
! y to the contrary to the contention of appellant. The court 
held in the Badger Lumber case where work is performed on 
two separate houses the claimant cannot file a lien for the 
whole amount of his lien on one house even though he at-
tempts to approximate the amount, that a mere approxima-
tion in segregation will not suffice. Such ·was the holding 
by this Honorable Court in Holbrook v Webster cited at 
page 6 of appellant's original reply brief. 
Respondent also states at page 7 of its brief in support 
of its petition for re-hearing, there are two bases under \rhich 
a materialman makes his sale to a contractor~ ( 1) on open 
account with no reference on his records to any property or 
project and ( 2) upon open account or specifically designated 
account and require~ from the purchaser a designation of the-
property on which the materials are to be used. The evi-
dence in the instant case is to the effect that appellant in-
quired of Mecham, the contractor, \rhen appellant observed 
materials being removed from each stockpile and used in 
houses in each area, if it should segregate its account and 
Mecham said: "No it \ra~ not neressa rY. it n1ade no differ-
ence." ( R. 62). 
At page 11 of respondent\~ brief in support of its mo-
tion for rehearing respondent inserts a fe"· quotes from 
Mecham, the contractor'~ testimony., ,,~hich portion together 
with other testimony given by Mecham is also inserted in 
appellant's brief at pages 17, 18 and 19. Then respondent 
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argues that for this court to apply the equitable apportion-
tionment rule based upon such evidence would make multiple 
('Onstruction financing virtually impossible, and respondent 
further argues that none of the authorities cited support this 
application. It must he remembered that Mecham was an 
adverse witness when giving his testimony, he was called 
under the rules, he did not deny that materials were used in 
the houses in each area of construction and taken from the 
stockpiles set up by him and to which appellant was in-
structed to make deliveries, on the contrary he admits that all 
n1aterials ordered by him from appellant were delivered by 
appellant to the site and used in construction in the four areas 
as houses were n1ade ready to receive plumbing materials, 
( R. 579,580), therefore materials having been delivered to 
the site of con~truction by appellant as ordered and directed 
by the contractor and neither the contractor or the supplier 
heing able to determine the amount of materials which went 
into each house, under all of the authorities cited, appellant 
is entitled to have it's lien equally apportioned with an 
equal amount charged against each house. 
CONCLUSION 
_As heretofore stated., this Honorable Court having al-
ready construed the Mechanic\.; Lien laws of this state, and 
appellant in reliance upon that construction having furnished 
its tnaterial~ which enhanced the value of the properties, 
and respondent having had a part in the manner in which 
construction was carried on on the property affected by these 
cases., whereas appellant acted in good faith at all times, 
respondent and not appellant who is an innocent party should 
suffer. The judgment should be reversed and the trial court 
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should be directed to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
as urged in appellant's original brief, or if estoppel is not 
applied then to find for appellant apportioning the lien of 
appellant equally as against the properties affected by the 
actions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. Backman, 
of Backman, Backman & Clark, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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